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Introduction
1 In  post-socialist  Vietnam,  the  blueprint  of  most  official  development  policies  in
mountainous areas is based on the understanding of social and economic structures of
the  Kinh  people,  the  dominant  ethnicity  in  the  nation’s  population  and  politics.
Mountainous areas, which account for nearly three quarters of the country surface, is
home to different ethnic minorities whose livelihood and social organisation are different
from those of Kinh people. As a result, ethnic minorities do not usually benefit directly
from official  development policies that are supposed to create a social  and economic
homogeneity for convenient governance from official point of view. This State-making
process  is  sometimes  considered  to  be  an  assimilation  of  ethnic  minorities  into  the
mainstream majority (McElwee, 2004). The paper targets one of those ethnic minorities,
the Bru-Van Kieu in Central Vietnam, who have experienced drastic changes in their
socio-economic conditions during the last 40 years. Their traditional living environment
has  transformed from a  landscape  dominated  by  seemingly  impassable  forest  where
ethnic minority people lived in scattering villages and practiced shifting cultivation to a
multi-ethnic  congregation  settlement  engaging  in  cash  cropping  and  trading.  More
significantly, the sense of remoteness that once characterised this upland area due to the
distance from lowland population centres and subsequently, the minimal territorial and
demographic  control  from  central  government,  has  disappeared.  Nowadays,  modern
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towns are an integral part of the official governing system, well-connected to central
political centres by a network of communication systems through local representatives of
State authority. The physical transformation in living environments of the Bru-Van Kieu
people is not an exception within contemporary Vietnamese society, where the nation-
State project is characterised by efforts of a postcolonial socialist State to increase its
penetration into, and control over, the population and territory in its previously remote
frontiers. This process, however, has paid little regard to the pre-existing socio-economic
conditions of  the indigenous people and has mainly imposed external  institutions on
them (Michaud and Forsyth, 2010). 
2 This paper aims to describe changes in the socio-political condition of the Bru-Van Kieu
peoples living in the border areas between Vietnam and Laos, in the context of increasing
State territorialisation.  The  authors  elaborate  the  mechanisms  by  which  State
territorialisation  via  official  development  policies  have  re-shaped  the  livelihood  and
traditional governance systems of ethnic minorities in the border areas, including Katup
Village. This is followed by a discussion on the response of the Bru-Van Kieu people in
Katup  Village  to  the  socio-political  changes  brought  about  by  official  development
policies.  It  is  argued  that  State territorialisation,  exercised  by  official  development
policies, has the tendency to marginalise, socially and politically, local ethnic minority
people by excluding them from indigenous social and economic geography and the use of
natural resource. At the receiving end of these official policies, the local ethnic minority
people do not passively tolerate but are able to initiate the use of both traditional cultural
resources and newly arising institutional and market tools to mitigate the impact from
the process of official institutionalisation of resources. 
 
Everyday resistance and State-territorialisation
Moral economy and everyday forms of peasant resistance
3 James  Scott  (1976)  examined  political  resistance  to  State  development  and market
mechanisms using the concept of peasant “moral economy”. This concept centres on the
principle that peasant communities share a set of normative attitudes concerning the
social relations and social behaviors that sustain a local economy. As a result they have a
tendency to oppose State authorities,  or market forces that are breaching local  rules
respecting existing social arrangements shaping their subsistence needs. Specifically on
Vietnam,  Scott  (1985)  argues  that  the  market  threatens  the  survival  of  peasant’s
subsistence economy and traditional social  relations that define the operation of this
economy. He argues that the peasants, whose priority is to reduce the risk of losing their
savings, tend to refrain from engaging in the market. In other words, they would prefer
to  protect  subsistence  needs  and  moral  relationships  rather  than  seek  to  maximise
profits.  Kerkvliet  (2005)  further  illustrates  how the powerless  farmers  in Vietnam in
agricultural cooperatives during the 1970s, unsatisfactory with productivity and benefit-
sharing mechanisms, struggled in what he terms “everyday resistance”. By “everyday
resistance”, he demonstrates individual covert acts and behaviors such as foot-dragging,
non-compliance,  petty theft to upset agricultural productivity in order to force more
powerful State and market actors into re-negotiation. 
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State-territorialisation as a State-making strategy
4 Internal territorialisation became a key strategy employed by the Vietnamese State to
strengthen its control over rural population and natural resources. It aims to control
rural people and resources, and categorise territory into zones of inclusion or exclusion
of accession right for different social groups (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995). In other
words,  Internal-territorialisation  defines  the  relation  between  the  State and  society
regarding the use of resource and space. In addition to internal territorialisation, State-
territorialisation  includes  sovereign  territorialisation.  Arguably  the  main  difference
between internal territorialisation and external territorialisation is the issue of how to
control  the  people.  While  by  internal  territorialisation,  (e.g.  the  creation  of  local
administration and resource exclusion) the State aims to control  people via different
methods  of  land-based  administration,  sovereign  territorialisation  is  more  about
controlling  territory  by  means  of  border  demarcation.  In  this  instance,  State-
territorialisation can be considered to be a strategy of State-building. As a concept, State-
making is defined as principally about strengthening the relationship between the State
and society, and developing effective ways to mediate this relationship (DIFD, 2009). A
State-making perspective emphasises that functioning institutions depend not only on
their technical design, but on the social context within which they operate. A study from
by OECD (2008) highlights that “formal institutions need to be rooted in society otherwise
they risk becoming mere shells or being captured by private or patrimonial interests”.
 
Traditional society of the Bru-Van Kieu
5 This section describes Bru-Van Kieu society in their traditional form and in isolation from
the general population. It is difficult to estimate at exactly what time the Bru-Van Kieu
people started to converge with the population of the dominant group, the Kinh, and the
influence of the ruling political entity; however, it would be safe to surmise that, before
the French colonialism, most of the Bru-Van Kieu villages were still in a primordial form
and isolated from the “civilised” world of the Kinh people. The Bru-Van Kieu organise a
patriarchal society where the eldest male is usually the head of the family. Inheritance is
exclusively  the  right  of  the  male  members.  Married couples  live  with the  husband’s
family, and their children bear the paternal name. A man is permitted to marry as many
wives as he can afford.
6 The Bru-Van Kieu generally did not have a socio-political structure beyond the village
level; that is to say, the village is most fundamental social organisation. Each village (vel)
consists of one or more lineages (mu). Within each lineage, authority rests with the eldest
male member (Nguyen, 2001). A council of elders, consisting of the heads of each lineage,
often gathered to discuss matters that concern multiple families. The council of elders
makes decisions concerning war, relocating the village, great hunting parties, settling
conflicts  between  families,  the  appropriate  sanctions  for  serious  violations  of  tribal
custom,  and  tradition.  When  the  village  deals  with  outsiders,  such  as  inter-village
conflicts, the patriarch, who is usually the wealthiest or most powerful member of the
council of elders, usually represents the village in settling the issue. 
7 In the many cases in which one lineage formed the village, the patriarch was the head of
that lineage. In this homogeneous political landscape, the patriarch was a chief, not a
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ruler. He and his family had to work for their food like other villagers. The Bru-Van Kieu
practiced a subsistence economy, primarily based on dry rice cultivated by the slash-and-
burn technique. In short, this technique involves cutting down and burning all vegetation
within a forested area. The resulting ashes serve as fertiliser, which helps the field sustain
a crop for three to four years. Crops grown by this method depended solely on rainfall for
irrigation. When the field is no longer fertile enough to support crops, the farmer finds
another tract of forestland and starts a new cycle of slash-and-burn, allowing the old
fields  to  rehabilitate  back  to  forest.  The  Bru-Van  Kieu  diet  is  supplemented  by  the
cultivation of corn and beans, and meat from hunting and fishing. Several authors have
claimed  that  this  tribal  group  has  traditionally  bartered  their  goods,  either  among
themselves or with the Kinh merchants traveling to their village or to a nearby market
town (Nguyen, 1984; Schrock et al., 1966). Land was the common property of the village
and allotted to families for the cultivation of crops. The power of making land allocation
decisions rest on the authority of the council of elders and the village patriarch. Since the
Bru-Van Kieu follow animism, several successive losses of crop or multiple deaths would
lead the patriarch to believe that the village is haunted by an evil spirit, which could
result in a decision to move the entire village to a new location.
 
Interaction betweenthe Bru-Van Kieu and dominant
ethnic and political groups
Pre-colonial period (1620-1885)
8 Written  accounts  of  the  contemporary  history  of  Central  Vietnam socio-politics  just
before the French arrived can be found exclusively in the official record of Phủ biên tạp lục
1. The author,  Lê Quý Đôn (1776)  described that lords of  the Nguyen 2 recognised the
existence  of  several  tribal  groups  on  the  western  upland.  The  official  ruling  court
addressed various ethnic groups in western upland region (Fig. 1) without any distinction
by the term “mọi” meaning “barbaric” and “savage” to discriminate them from more
populous lowland Kinh people. On a trip to western upland of Thuan Hoa3 he noted the
presence of different “uncivilised” ethnic groups. There is a high chance that modern
Bru-Van Kieu people are descendants of the ethnic community living in Vien Kieu area
described by Lê Quý Đôn in 18th century. More importantly, it was noted that these “
barbaric savages” were not registered individually in official record system for taxation
purposes. The most significant interaction between residents of Vien Kieu area and Kinh
lowlanders was the exchange of goods where Kinh lowlanders traded salt,  fish sauce,
dried fish, iron wares, copper pots, silver hairpins and bracelets for rice, chicken, oxen,
hemp, wax, rattan and cotton cloth woven by uplanders (Li, 1998).
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Figure 1. Part of Central Vietnam.
9 In Phủ Biên it is frequently mentioned that Nguyen lords preferred to avoid unnecessary
conflicts with major tribes in pre-colonial Laos. This gave resonance to the thinking that
conquering the territory and population of the Thuan Hoa western mountainous area was
not a political and military priority of the Nguyen (Li, 1998). In fact before the French
colonialisation the western mountainous flank of what is now Quang Tri Province was
under contested influence of different Laotian tribes, Siamese Kingdom and the Nguyen
(Stuart-Fox, 2008). Li (1998) also pointed that even though Kinh people started to push
their population to Thuan Hoa hinterland, intermarriage between Kinh lowlanders and
local ethnic minorities was limited reflecting Vietnamese prejudices on the barbaric and
savage culture of tribal minority peoples. 
10 In  summary,  before  European  colonialism  controlling  Bru-Van  Kieu  area  was  not  a
pressing concern of the Nguyen, the dominating official political and military power at
that time, because the latter found their quest to the south and defense to the north a
higher priority. Apart from a small population engaged in trading with lowlanders, most
tribal peoples in the mountainous west of Quang Tri Province preferred to keep a social
distance from Vietnamese migrants. Being out of easy reach of political centres of the
Vietnamese,  Laotian  and  Thai  people  and  keeping  Vietnamese  migrants  as  stranger
helped ethnic  minorities  in  the western mountain of  modern Quang Tri  province in
general and the Bru-Van Kieu in particular retain their unique culture and autonomy. 
 
French Colonial period (1885-1954)
11 The Western mountains of Quang Tri province, then, part of French Annam Protectorate,
played an important role in French administration for its connection with Laos, another
French colony. Although several French colonialists set up coffee plantation on the basalt
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soil in Khe Sanh valley they did not come into close contact with local Bru-Van Kieu
people because they all preferred to bring Kinh lowlanders to work as plantation cullies
(Le et al., 1993). In his anthropological survey in Central Vietnam, Hickey (2002) described
that by mid-20th century, however, a few Bru-Van Kieu people living in Khe Sanh sold
their labour periodically but not steadily in several coffee plantations for cash. They, for
the first time in Van-Kieu history, encountered the international commodity chain as Khe
Sanh coffee was famous in Indochina in early 1960s (Hickey, 2002). For the majority of
Bru-Van Kieu population to the west of Khe Sanh, the influence of lowlanders and the
French was limited. The French administration requested Bru-Van Kieu villages to pay a
small amount of tax, however, it is unclear via which instrument and to what extent the
French could enforce this policy (Schrock et  al.,  1966).  When Vietnamese nationalists
found a footing in western forested mountains to mount their resistance against the
French, thus, inviting retaliation from the latter and together increasing hostility in the
area, most Bru-Van Kieu apart from those residing in Khe Sanh opted to escape into
deeper forest and mountains where they felt safe to avoid conflict (Le et al., 1993).
 
Second Indochina War (1954-1975)
12 Different governments of the southern Republic of Vietnam attempted to substitute State
law with tribal  customary rules  to  integrate  upland communities  into  official  power
(Schrock et al., 1966). This effort in the area of the Bru-Van Kieu in western Quang Tri had
little  chance  to  be  implemented because  the  area  had never  been in  full  control  of
southern governments for its close proximity to, hence heavy influence from the State of
northern  Democratic  Republic  of  Vietnam4.  Communist  infiltration  and  insurgency
started as early as 1959 along National Route 9 (Nguyen and Nguyen, 2010). During the
Second Indochina War, the forested mountain of Annamite Cordillera5 was hardly a safe
haven for  anyone as  the  American military  relentlessly  raided both the eastern and
western  sides  of  the  range  by  sky  and  ground forces  to  block  an  increasingly  fluid
network of  crucial  trails  transporting men,  supplies  and weapons from the northern
socialist to their comrades in the south in the struggle against southern capitalists and
their allies (Stuart-Fox, 2008). With little space left untouched by the war, most Bru-Van
Kieu in Huong Hoa district had no choice but to reluctantly ally with different political
and military entities made of lowlanders.  In 1965, the government of the Republic of
Vietnam resettled many Bru-Van Kieu people from their remote area to a three-mile strip
on each side of National Route 9 in Khe Sanh to pre-emptively prevent their assistance to
pro-socialist forces (Schrock et al., 1966). It is estimated that ten thousand Bru-Van Kieu
concentrated  around  Khe  Sanh  valley  when  different  US  military  camps  started
occupying this location in the early 1960s. Among them around 1,000 men were on the
payroll of the American military (Clarke and William, 2007). According to McElwee (2008,
p.  95)  the Bru-Van Kieu in western Quang Tri  at  this  time “were on the horns of  a
dilemma.  If  they farmed close to the settlement,  there was insufficient land and the
Communists harassed them for being pro-government; if they farmed out where land was
plentiful the government suspected them of supporting the Viet Cong.”
13 At the same time Bru-Van Kieu people to the west of Khe Sanh valley were under the
influence of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). A memoir of Nguyen Khac Nguyet (2009),
a NVA veteran, described vividly the support from Bru-Van Kieu people in late 1960s to
his unit during their offense on American military position. In fact, Nguyet’s memoir is
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only one of many published and unpublished accounts from war veterans devoting part
of their content to illustrate the allegiance of Bru-Van Kieu in the Second Indochina War.
What can be concluded is that Bru-Van Kieu people were reluctantly dragged into the
conflicts of other dominant ethnic and political groups when their neutral and evasive
tactic to avoid direct confrontation was no longer an option. After the war, Bru-Van Kieu
people in Khe Sanh came back to their former village.  The Bru-Van Kieu who found
asylum in  Laos  also  returned  to  their  home  village.  For  both  pro-socialist  and  pro-
capitalist Van Kieu, they all had to start almost from scratch after years of dislocation, in
war-contaminated farming land and amidst unchanged attitude from the Kinh majority. 
 
The Bru-Van Kieu in Katup Village
14 The study site is Katup Village in Lao Bao Town, Huong Hoa District, Quang Tri Province,
Vietnam. Katup Village is located on the border between Laos and Vietnam. The research
discussed in this paper is  resulted from fieldwork conducted in border area between
Vietnam and Laos on four occasions, March 2012, October 2012, July 2013 and March 2014
during which the authors spent nearly 8 weeks on the field. For Katup Village, general
information regarding local demography, economy and ethnicity was obtained from Lao
Bao Town’s People Committee before the fieldwork was conducted. After that the authors
acquired further information concerning household’s number of members,  number of
labourers, income, livelihood activities, social connections and history of settlement from
head of individual households via questionnaire. From a total of 72 households in Katup
Village, 69 questionnaires were responded. Among these households, random households
were chosen for in-depth interview to gain further detail on cross-border interactions
between local Katup villagers with Laotian co-ethnics and also with officials in Vietnam.
To gain more insight on this matter, the authors also conducted in-depth interview with 5
Laotian  Bru-Van  Kieu  households  at  their  village  in  Laos  and  several  officials  of
Vietnamese Border Patrol. In addition, small group discussions among households with
kinship relations were conducted to reveal their cooperation in cross-border activities. At
the time of last fieldwork in 2014, the population of Katup Village was at 372. Except for
one  Pacoh  family,  all  others  in  the  village  are  Bru-Van  Kieu.  The  language  for
questionnaire and in-depth interview was Vietnamese.  In case a  respondent  was not
proficient in spoken and written Vietnamese, translation and interpretation service from
a Bru-Van Kieu translator was needed. Secondary data from official archives and veteran
memoir coupled with personal accounts of Bru-Van Kieu was compiled to reconstruct a
brief socio-political history of the local area. 
 
History of Katup Village
15 Elders  in Katup Village did not  remember how long they have been settled in their
current location. What they did remember, and kept recalling, was that their parents and
grandparents lived along the Sepon River (Fig. 2) since, in their language, the “time of the
French”. At the heat of war in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they crossed the river to
hide in caves deep in Laos’s territory. As early as 1974, the Bru-Van Kieu returned to
Katup Village’s former location by the river. During the resettlement process, while most
households farmed land in Vietnam, a proportion of households started clearing land to
farm on Laos’s territory. In the late 1970s, following a border demarcation agreement
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between  the  Vietnamese  and  Laotian  governments,  the  river  was  reaffirmed  as  the
political border (see Truong et al., 2007). Katup villagers on both sides of the river were
officially asked to choose their nationality and then to resettle to their chosen State’s
territory.  Most  of  the  families  chose  their  nationality  based  on  the  location  of  their
farming land. That is, families who had the majority of their farming land in Laos or
Vietnam chose to become Laotian or Vietnamese, respectively, as their nationality. Some
families  moved,  in  order  to re-unite  with their  immediate  families.  In reality,  Katup
villagers did not fully comprehend the significance of the border demarcation and their
selection of a nationality at that time. Elders still recall that their life did not change
immediately after the border was demarcated, and they quickly forgot that they were
then of different nationalities. It was only years later, when border guards increased their
presence in that area and started constructing physical representations such as border
markers and outposts along the border while constantly giving locals lectures on the
topic of political border and national sovereignty, that the Bru-Van Kieu in Katup Village
began to realise an institutional barrier was forming between them and their brothers in
Laos. Today, in the area of the traditional Katup Village, there are two different villages
by the name Katup; Katup Village on the Vietnam side and Katup Noy6 on the Laos side.
 
Figure 2. The relative location of Katup Village.
16 Although existing as two separate political entities at the moment, the two villages are
still connected by rich patrilineal kinship and marriages. Reciprocal exchange and mutual
help are still  popular in this  small  Bru-Van Kieu community.  Occasionally,  there are
gatherings of several households to give collective effort to heavy works, such as forest
clearing for agricultural land or constructing a house for a family. Villagers from both
sides of the Sepon River will attend a family’s marriage and funeral rituals. Gathering of
relatives from both sides of the border to drink at the end of the day is a popular social
event.  Despite  the  fact  that  Laotian  official  authorities  address  the  Bru-Van  Kieu
community on the opposite side of Sepon River as “Katup – Ma Hat Village Group”7 (Fig.
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2), the Laotian Bru-Van Kieu, who originate from Katup Village, still address their village
using the old name, Katup, in everyday conversations.
 
Household economy of the Bru-Van Kieu
17 Swidden  farming  still  plays  an  important  role  among  Katup  villagers.  All  of  the
households  participating  in  in  in-depth  interview  indicated  that  swidden  farming
occupies a large proportion of their working time, and provides an important food source
and income (Table 1). Lao Bao Town is in a basin encompassed by hilly and mountainous
terrain to the north and the Sepon River curving around the southwest, leaving a narrow
and nearly flat basin in the middle (Fig. 2). Most of the swidden plots used by the Bru-Van
Kieu in Katup Village are in the northern,  mountainous terrain,  adjacent to those of
neighbouring communes.  Swidden farming among Katup villagers produces two main
types of crops: staple-food crops and cash crops. For their staple foods, Bru-van Kieu
peoples plant sweet potatoes, corn, beans, and local varieties of corn and dry rice. Cash
crops are gradually becoming a major component in the swidden lands of Katup villagers.
In  the  past,  chili,  peppers,  and  mangoes  were  the  main  crops,  but  they  became
unprofitable and were recently replaced by cassava, bananas, and bollywood8. Among the
interviewed households in Katup Village,  swidden plots ranged from 0.5 ha to 2.5 ha
(Table 1). The official demarcation of swidden land for Katup villagers ended in 2011,
resulting in more than half of the population receiving a Red Book9, while the other half
already  had  their  land  demarcated10. Agricultural  intensification  techniques,  such  as
using machinery or fertiliser, are not popular for staple crops, and as a result, soil fertility
depletes within two to three years of harvesting. The lack of machinery and fertilisers is a
result  of  the  Bru-Van  Kieu’s  inexperience  with  intensification  technology,  a  lack  of
financial investment, and the steep terrain that makes machinery hard to use and the
land susceptible to erosion.  Among the interviewed households,  the majority planted
both staple and food crops, while only a small number cultivated a single staple crop, due
to the small size of their swidden land (Table 1). The results also indicate that there has
been a gradual shift to cash crops, in which cassava11 is dominant. 
18 Several families in Katup Village rear chickens and ducks at a small scale, primarily for
household consumption. Pigs and cattle are rarely seen in Katup. The sandy tract of soil
along the Sepon River is narrow, but suitable for cultivating sweet potatoes and corn in
the dry season when the water level is low. The Bru-Van Kieu do not pay special attention
to the plants in their garden. Most home gardens are characterised by poorly nurtured
fruit plants, such as papayas, oranges, and bananas.
19 Collecting  non-timber  forest  products  (NTFPs)  plays  an  important  role  in  the  Katup
household economy. When it is not raining, the Bru-Van Kieu people go into the forest to
collect bamboo sprouts, wild jackfruit, and young banana flowers12. The task usually falls
on  the  shoulders  of  the  household’s  female  members,  such  as  the  grandmothers,
housewives, or daughters13. Another significant source of NTFPs is firewood, usually the
by-product of the process of clearing and burning a forest to prepare it for agricultural
use. The adult males in a family transport burnt tree trunks from swidden farm to home,
split them to firewood, and then sell them to restaurants in Lao Bao Town. Most of the
collected products are of commercial value. The female members of a family sell these
products, with the exception of firewood, at local markets. On average, each interviewed
family earns approximately USD 80 a  month from selling NTFPs.  A small  number of
Negotiating the State-making in Vietnam borderland – Case study of an ethnic ...
Belgeo, 4 | 2016
9
households earn an additional USD 100 from timber sales. This task, performed by adult
men, involves a small group of close-knit relatives extracting valuable timber from the
forest and selling it to local Kinh intermediates or carpenters14.
 
Table 1. Household economy – selected descriptions.
Source: field survey, March and July 2013 
 
State territorialisation since 1975
Official institutionalisation of natural resources and exclusion of
local people from their traditional space and resource
20 The  migration  of  Kinh  people  from the  lowlands  has  changed  not  only  the  general
population of Lao Bao Town but also the local political economy, removing the Bru-Van
Kieu people from their traditional role as the exclusive residents and resources users.
After national unification in 1975,  the State saw replicating the collective agriculture
model to the southern and upland regions as imperative, because this model, dominant in
the northern Vietnam lowlands since the late 1950s, was regarded as the fundamental
pinnacle of socialist ideology pursued by the State (Pingali and Vo, 1992). The official
boundary divisions did not consider the traditional culture and production space of the
Bru-Van Kieu people. On the other hand, the new boundary had significant implications
for the Bru-Van Kieu people, because their residential and agricultural space was, for the
first  time  in  history,  charted  into  and  administered  by  the  national  administrative
system. Following this official administrative division, their traditional land became the
territory  of  a  different  administrative  unit,  and  of  its  new, “ legal” users.  Official
institutions did not recognise the traditional land system of Bru-Van Kieu people; hence,
they did not see the institutionalisation of land in Lao Bao Town in 1975 as an act that
took the factor of production away from the Bru-Van Kieu people in order to grant it to
Kinh immigrants. Common official discourses described the land in Lao Bao as “unused”,
“unoccupied”, and “barren”, and allocating the land to new immigrants was a logical and
legal action to prevent the land from being wasted (Nguyen and Nguyen, 2010). Official
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demarcation occurred not only within communes but also between communes, districts,
and  eventually  nations.  What  the  Bru-Van  Kieu  considered  as  their  rightful  and
traditional land, cleared by their forefathers and endowed to them by inheritance for
generations  –  considerations  that  were strictly  observed among fellow Bru-Van Kieu
people – was, on the contrary, viewed by official authorities as an environment lacking a
pre-existing  social  arrangement.  Officials  conceptualised  the  Bru-Van  Kieu  territory
merely as a new unit to be integrated into the large, national physical geography that was
subject to official political will and unquestionably outside of the Bru-Van Kieu’s political
power. 
 
Fragmentation of traditional social geography
21 International border and its official enforcement threaten to fragmentise a traditional
fluid and continuous social and economic landscape of the Bru-Van Kieu. Upon border
demarcation, the Bru-Van Kieu were requested by the authorities to sedentarise their
settlement, either on Vietnam territory or on Laotian territory. Mobilisation across their
traditional  social  landscape  is  now  restricted  by  a  political  border  which  was  only
increased with higher presence of State’s law enforcement in the form of Border patrol,
to  control the  flow  of  people,  and  Customs,  to  control  the  flow  of  material.  Since
economic  reform,  foreign  trading  with  Laos  through  Lao  Bao  Town  has  increased
significantly. Along with this is an increase in the presence of official law enforcement. In
the past, to visit a relative opposite of the river, the Bru-Van Kieu had to pass physical
barriers such as river, mountain and the distance between villages. Today, even though
those physical barriers might not be as challenging as in the past with the improvement
in infrastructure such as road and bridges, they have to overcome political barriers. The
river is no longer simply a physical barrier, because to pass it they need permission from
authorities Within Bru-Van Kieu area, socio-economic conditions gradually differentiate
the Vietnamese side from the Laotian side as a result of different general development
state between the two countries. This differentiation threatens the homogeneity of Bru-
Van Kieu society. 
 
The impact of State territorialisation on the Bru-Van
Kieu in Katup Village
Loss of the traditional subsistence agricultural system
22 During the period of collective farming, from 1975 through the early 1990s, the Bru-Van
Kieu in Katup Village were encouraged to join Tan Kim 215, a production unit that already
consisted  of  a  portion  of  the  households  in  Tan  Kim Village,  newly  established  by
immigrants from Trieu Phong Commune. In order to make space for a residential area for
new arrivals and collective farming land, Tan Kim 2 production unit appropriated the flat
area along the Sepon River which happened to be part of the landholdings of several Bru-
Van Kieu households. The Bru-Van Kieu faced competition over land not only from the
production unit but also from individual Kinh households.  Collective farming did not
provide enough food for the immigrant population, and as a result individual immigrant
households sought extra swidden land on which to plant  their  own household crops
(Nguyen and  Nguyen,  2010).  Often  they  cultivated  into  tracts  of  land  that  appeared
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forested and unused, but were in fact already under the traditional ownership of Bru-Van
Kieu households. In such interethnic land disputes, indigenous and immigrant claimants
often negotiated a solution acceptable to both parties, frequently in the form of material
compensation from Kinh household to the Bru-Van Kieu household in exchange for land.
Nonetheless, if the plot of land in dispute was outside Lao Bao territory, the Bru-Van Kieu
in Katup Village faced the possibility of losing their traditional land, because the Kinh
claimant would use the official land division between production units and communes as
leverage to argue that the Bru-Van Kieu villagers did not have the right to use the land in
another administrative unit where they were not officially registered as residents. 
23 Nowadays,  Bru-Van  Kieu  households’ landholdings  are  merely  remnants  of  their
traditional area. Although there were no statistics on land holdings among the Bru-Van
Kieu in Katup Village before 1975, a transnational comparison of current landholdings
may suggest that the Bru-Van Kieu in Katup Village suffered a huge loss in access to
agricultural land. The Laotian Bru-Van Kieu respondents estimated that each of their
households in Katup Noy Village, across the Sepon River, had on average seven to eight
hectares  of  swidden  land.  Traditionally,  indigenous  Bru-Van  Kieu  need  a  large
landholding if  they are  to  sustain their  shifting cultivation practice.  By dividing the
uncharted territory into small administrative units, the official authority confined the
production space of  the Bru-Van Kieu people.  For the first  time,  traditional,  shifting
cultivation  became  unlawful  because  it  would,  by  its  expansive  nature,  violate  the
political  boundaries  drawn  by  the  State.  While  establishing  official  boundaries
“unintentionally” reduced the land that was accessible to the Bru-Van Kieu and created
institutional barriers that reduced traditional production space, the immigration of the
Kinh people put further pressure on land. From 1976 to 2011 the population of Lao Bao
Town quandrupled  as  a  result  of  immigration of  Kinh people  from lowland (Fig.  3).
Together, these factors resulted in a sharp decrease in landholding among indigenous
households, which was necessary for the viability of their traditional subsistence farming.
 
Figure 3. Population of Lao Bao Town, 1976–201116.
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The decreasing role of the traditional governance system
24 An important function of the traditional governance system in the Bru-Van Kieu society
was the management of land as a common pool resource and the maintenance of fairly
equal  land  allocation  among  clans  and  households  in  the  village.  In  the  process  of
expanding its  power to  the periphery,  the  State institutionalised land resources  and
replaced the traditional governance system for allocating land. As a result, the traditional
governance system gradually diminished. Dang Dinh Trung (2003) indicated that in the
Central  Highland legally protected changes in land relations from communal  land to
private ownership relegated the influence of the informal decision-making system. He
pointed out that the polan, a traditional decision maker who allocated land and forest
resources  and  sanctioned  violations  of  land-related  religious  prescriptions  became  a
symbolic figure in charge of celebrating the worship of the land spirit when the land was
officially  allocated  to  individual  households.  Another  study  among  the  Katu  people,
another ethnic minority sharing various cultural and political similarities to the Bru-Van
Kieu people in the mountainous area of Central Vietnam, has shown that the indigenous
local governance system was fighting a losing battle against the rising and more powerful
official ruling system (Nguyen and Kim, 2013). 
25 In Katup Village, official institutions had been heavily challenging the traditional political
system  since  1975;  nonetheless  at  that  time  the  Bru-Van  Kieu  still  unconditionally
respected and observed the decision-making role of  the patriarch,  the symbol of  the
traditional governance system. Starting in the mid-1990s, when Lao Bao Town became the
focal point in the development plan for Quang Tri Province, the power struggle between
the traditional and official systems began to shift further in favour of the latter. At this
time, the official institution departed from its early administrative role over land and
people at the village level to a more penetrating involvement at the household level,
through  rural  development  schemes  such  as  poverty  eradication,  family  planning,
mandatory primary education, and healthcare. James Ferguson argued that implementing
development projects was the basis for extending the power of the State and a tool for
building  governmental  presence  from  a  distance  (Ferguson,  2006).  The  evidence  of
increasing State power at the village level can be found in the emergence and rise of the
village headman, an officially appointed position. In the late 1990s, an elder17 was chosen
by Lao Bao Town People’s  Committee,  the main official  authority,  as the first  village
headman  to  watch  over  official  programmes.  This  marked  the  start  of  the  official
presence of a State representative at the village level, even though subtle influences have
been in place since 1975. 
26 In the context of increasing interaction with official institutions, the village headman
becomes a stronger figure in village politics while the patriarch becomes weaker. The
official  system does  not  deal  with Katup Village as a  collective entity,  but  rather  as
individual households. Each household and member was provided with a set of different
official  certificates18, which  is  required  when that  household  works  with  the  official
authorities. Applying for these certificates is time-consuming and troublesome, even for
Vietnamese  Kinh.  The  position  of  the  village  headman  therefore  became  important,
because he is able to assist his villagers in acquiring these documents by understanding
how the procedure works and by translating between his native language and the official
Vietnamese  language,  the  former  of  which  is  spoken  by  very  few  officials.  Table  2
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illustrates the power division between the village headman and the patriarch. At first, a
village headman may only be a  bridge between the official  authorities  and villagers.
Gradually, as the daily activities of each Bru-Van Kieu household became interwoven into
official schemes and programmes, the village headman becomes the real leader, replacing
the patriarch. All of the Katup villagers agree that, nowadays, the village headman is
more important than the patriarch. The significance of the latter is confined to ritual
works and to maintaining “hòa thuận” [harmony] between member households in the
village. The fact that the patriarch’s role is diminishing in the community, where his role
represents power, indicates the descent of the traditional governance system, in contrast
to the rise of State influence.
 
Table 2. Current power divisions in Katup Village.
Source: field survey, July 2013
27 In summary, the Bru-Van Kieu in Katup Village are being denied their full traditional
social and economic life. When coercively included into political economy system of the
ethnic majority, they are marginalised. 
 
Local responses
28 This final section investigates how the Bru-Van Kieu in Katup Village responds to the
unfavourable socio-economic and political changes that were brought about by the State
development policies. The long-term adaptation of an ethnic minority to a new political
reality  is  dependent  on  both  macro  factors,  such  as  the  national  agenda,  and  local
specifics, such as their location, languages, history, and cultural proximity to lowland
majorities  (Michaud  and  Forsyth,  2010).  It  is,  therefore,  the  authors’ intention  to
determine the local specifics affecting the Bru-Van Kieu people’s responses to external
normalizing factors. 
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Preservation of village culture
29 Polygamy  was  an  essential  part  of  traditional  Bru-Van  Kieu  society,  since  the  high
demand for males in the extended farming system implies that an additional wife offers
additional labour and the possibility of more male offspring. The modern economy of the
Bru-Van  Kieu  has  significantly  transformed  from  traditional  shifting  cultivation.
Furthermore, the practice of polygamy is prohibited by official law. Despite all of these
modern  obstacles,  the  Bru-Van  Kieu  males  in  Katup  Village  still  practice  polygamy,
although  admittedly  in  smaller  numbers19. The  Bru-Van  Kieu  have  widely  accepted
polygamy as an unquestionably traditional social norm, despite knowing that the practice
is  against  official  rules.  Mr.  Mung,  the  headman  of  Katup  Village,  is  the  local
representative of the State, as well as a member of the village community. Mr. Mung’s
daily  behavior  reflects  his  dilemma of  political  dualism.  Mr.  Mung has  not  reported
polygamy cases in his village to the commune authority, although this task is seemingly
his duty as the representative of the official bureaucratic system. On the contrary, he
helped to legalise the children of a second spouse20. To some extent, we can consider the
village headman in Katup Village as the locus at which State power and village tradition
merge and clash. His dualism, between the position of a State representative and a Bru-
Van Kieu, between performing his official duty and his obligation to tradition, further
solidifies the concept that the border area is the sphere at which official power and local,
traditional institutions are merged and contested. 
30 Another aspect of traditional Bru-Van Kieu society, which is still frequently practiced in
the present, is labour-exchange. The intensive assignments that a family may engage in –
such as collecting firewood, preparing land, harvesting crops, and constructing houses –
often attract voluntarily labour from other villagers. This is a popular village norm that
was  practiced  to  different  degrees  by  all  of  the  houses  in  the  village  that  were
interviewed. Traditionally, at the end of dry-rice harvest period, which usually falls at
that end of March and consists of activities that attract intensive labour-exchange in a
short period of time, the Bru-Van Kieu celebrate a festival called “cúng lúa mới”, which
loosely  translates  as  “greeting  newly  harvested  rice”.  The  festival,which  consists  of
slaughtering  water-buffalo,  swine,  and  chickens,  and  drinking  that  lasts  for  several
days,is condemned by official authorities as superstitious, wasteful, and unnecessary, and
is therefore prohibited. Nonetheless, the Bru-Van Kieu people in Katup Village continue
to celebrate “cúng lúa mới”, at the village scale in a more covert form. The villagers no
longer slaughter water buffalo for this festival, because they are too expensive for even
the village to collectively afford. In addition, they may organise the festival after they
have harvested and sold their industrial cassava, which occurs once a year. 
 
Social and livelihood space beyond the reach of the State
31 Unconsciously or not, the Bru-Van Kieu have downplayed the importance of the political
border  as  much  as  they  can  by  maintaining  social  relations  and  activities  across  a
geographic area that is unobstructed by political boundaries. The physical gap, in the
form of Sepon River, and the political barrier are made insignificant by daily border-
crossings via a boat, operated by a Katup family, which transports people, motorbikes,
and goods across the river, without requiring travelers to present their travel document.
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Existing  during  the  reign  of  the  passport,  such  cross-border  movement  attract  our
attention because it challenges the nature of a seemingly established system. 
32 The Bru-Van Kieu in  Katup Village  cross  the  river  to  Laos  on a  daily  basis,  for  the
purposes of both visiting relatives and their daily livelihoods. Given the history between
Katup and its sister village in Laos, most of households in either village have relatives in
the other. Bru-Van Kieu young men often cross the border to the Bru-Van Kieu villages in
Laos to visit their relatives and to court potential partners introduced by their relatives21. 
The  Bru-Van  Kieu  maintain  intra-ethnic  marriages  not  only  with  co-ethnics  in
Vietnamese territory but also in Laotian territory. What the authorities define as cross-
border marriages seem to the Bru-Van Kieu merely as the normal social matching in their
community. 
33 Apart from taking short trips to Laos to visit their relatives, the Bru-Van Kieu in Katup
also cross the border on daily basis for their livelihood activities, which include collecting
forest products and practicing of swidden farming22. While collecting NTFPs and
extracting timber has traditionally been done by Katup villagers, even on the Laotian
side, the Vietnamese Bru-Van Kieu’s practice of cultivating land in Laos reminds us of a
strategy for negating the adverse impacts that stem from the loss of land used for shifting
cultivation and the conversion of land over to commercial crops. Faced with the land
deprivation on the Vietnamese side, the Bru-Van Kieu in Katup Village, as well as the
Kinh people in Lao Bao Town and its neighbour communes, look for sparsely populated
areas in Laos where they might cultivate cash crops, especially bananas, thanks to the
better soil fertility found there. Agricultural land in this remote corner of Laos is beyond
the strict,  official jurisdiction, and practically under customary control of the Laotian
Bru-Van Kieu; hence, their Vietnamese co-ethnics could acquire land for production by
borrowing it from their Laotian co-ethnics. The borrowers are usually families in Katup
Village who have become landless after engaging in the cash-crop economy, or families
whose land was unproductive. The right to borrow and the obligation to lend land may
sound unfamiliar to outsiders, but for the Bru-Van Kieu people, it is a popular social norm
from the past that follows the principle of reciprocity and mutual help. Mr. H, a Bru-Van
Kieu household head in Katup Village in Laos said that “... he has no land but a family to
feed. I have spare land that I can survive without. Letting him borrow the land to plant
crops is the right thing to do” (Field survey, 2013).
34 It should be noted that the State representatives at local level are well aware of cross-
border activities exercised by the Bru-Van Kieu. Their tolerance of “illicit” activities may
stem from several reasons: first, local law enforcement are short in staff and finance;




35 It is true that, even before the demarcation of the international border, the Bru-Van Kieu
people had been travelling, unhindered by the river, around the area to collect forest
products and practice farming. If cross-border activities among the Bru-Van Kieu who
live in Katup Village do not coincide with the unfavourable changes that have occurred in
their surroundings over the last 40 years, how can they be considered as reactionary? We
argue  that,  even  though  the  activities  were  not  unprecedented,  the  Bru-Van  Kieu
consciously  interpreted  their  actions  in  a  different  manner.  In  other  words,  their
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reactions were an attempt to bridge the enormous economic and political gap in order to
bring themselves some advantage in their unequal struggle against the State and the
dominant majority.  The following examples,  both of  which illustrate the preferential
treatment of co-ethnics by the Bru-Van Kieu people, will further elaborate on the above
argument.
36 As mentioned above, both the Kinh and Bru-Van Kieu use a boat, operated by a Bru-Van
Kieu family living in Katup Village, to cross the Sepon River. The boat’s owner- operator
gives  preferential treatment  based  on  ethnicity.  He  never  asks  for  a  fee  when
transporting23 his Bru-Van Kieu co-ethnics,  regardless of whether they are Laotian or
Vietnamese. As for Kinh travellers, however, there is always a cost. 
37 In another example, although there are both Kinh and Bru-Van Kieu farmers cultivating
land belonging to the Laotian Bru-Van Kieu people, the Laotian landowners’ treatment of
these two ethnic groups is different. The relationship between Laotian landowners and
Kinh farmers is that of an owner-renter, in which the latter have to pay a fair sum of
money to the former in order to rent their user rights. At the same time, the relationship
between the Laotian Bru-Van Kieu and their Vietnamese co-ethnics is that of an owner-
borrower, in which the latter does not make any monetary payments (Table 3). This is
because the Bru-Van Kieu developed a perception that, unlike the Katup Bru-Van Kieu
who borrowed the land to supplement their household economy, the Kinh farmers were
after profit ventures.
 
Table 3. Laotian Bru-Van Kieu’s different treatment of Vietnamese farmers on the basis of ethnicity.
*The annual land tariff, paid via the head of village-group to the district authority, at
30,000 Laotian Kips (equivalent to USD 4), is not considered as a substantial amount by
local standards.
Source: field survey, July 2013
 
“Illicit” timber relationship
38 As mentioned earlier, there is a small number of Bru-Van Kieu households engaging in
the more lucrative timber smuggling from Laos to Vietnam. Although deemed illicit, at
village level this activity is made possible by the relationship between these Bru-Van Kieu
villagers and members of Border Patrol stationed in the post at the very the entrance to
the village. According to one Bru-Van Kieu timber smuggler, they pay bribe directly to
these Border Patrol men at about 40 to 50 per cent of market value of timber successfully
smuggled  from  each  trip,  estimated  at  around  USD  800-1000.  These  bribes  would
guarantee them no interference during the transport made by motorbike to Kinh buyers
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outside their village24. Apart from “safe passage” of their timber to the buyers, the Bru-
Van Kieu are frequently provided with information from local Border Patrol of specific
time window when law enforcement officers from higher chain of command visit local
area.  During these visits,  strict  rules are applied to cross-border any illicit  activities,
disregarding any on-going arrangements between local Border Patrol and villagers. From
the local Border Patrol’s perspective, the revenue gained from smugglers enable them to
carry out what they call  as “dân vận” (public relation) operation25 at village level.  In
addition, creating a close relationship with those Bru-Van Kieu having extensive cross-
border economic engagement helps Border Patrol gain information about other informal
conducts in border area.  This  information is  important in making periodic report  to
higher command justifying their request for further investment of financial and human
resources to strengthening border security.
 
Discussion
From moral economy to market economy
39 In this article we argue that official interventions and market intrusions in Lao Bao Town
have resulted in the social and political marginalisation of the Bru-Van Kieu people in
Katup Village. This case study shows that livelihood and culture are highly interwoven in
the transformation in Bru-Van Kieu society, first transforming their livelihood, then the
loss of their traditional shifting cultivation, and finally expanding to the cultural and
political  domain,  resulting  in,  for  example,  the  demise  of  their  traditional  power
structure. Changes in livelihood can lead to serious deterioration in the ethnic minorities’
culture  and  identity,  which  extend  beyond  the  understanding  of  planners  and
practitioners  and  may  prompt  resistance  from  the  beneficiaries.  This  calls  for
understanding the term “better-off” from the perspective of  ethnic minorities rather
than from a national majority’s definition of development. The theme of this paper is not
to suggest that the Bru-Van Kieu people object to change. Like in any other societies, they
are interested in improving their standard of living and lessening their daily hardship.
They resist because the changes, brought about by State development policy and market
liberation, are too drastic to the degree of threatening the existence of the cultural and
economic world that the Bru-Van Kieu understand. In this case, the response of the Bru-
Van Kieu can be seen as a classic example of Scott’s school of “moral economy” and “
everyday resistance”. One of the most important assets of the Bru-Van Kieu people in
Katup Village  is  their  cultural  capital,  which  they share  with  their  cross-border  co-
ethnics. The dense network of kinship, history, and language shared with their co-ethnics
creates a social  space that enables the Bru-Van Kieu people to escape from the total
control  of  the powerful  State.  Norms defining resource use in this  transnational  and
traditional community become useful tools for the Katup villagers to use when mitigating
the impact of  the official  institutionalisation of resources and of market penetration.
Although  cross-border  farming  and  NTFPs  collection  are  purely  livelihood  activities,
maintaining  these  activities  also  means  conserving  their  culture  and  a  development
agenda that is not in line with the State’s definition of national identity. The authors
strongly believe that the Bru-Van Kieu villagers in Katup Village do not think that their
daily activities are acts of resistance against the State’s agenda. However, their form of
subtle  resistance seriously questions the power of  the State at  its  border,  because it
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undermines the very first objective of the State in creating international border, which is
to build a homogeneous political space, from the centre toward the edge of the society,
within which the State can effectively exercise its power.
40 This case study, however,  also illustrates elements supporting Samuel Popkin’s (1979)
model of rational self-interest and utility-maximizing peasant behavior. The behavior of
small number of Bru-Van Kieu timber smugglers proves that decision to engage in cross-
border activities is not only a reaction to loss of subsistence economy, preservation of
traditional mobility but also rational economic calculation. The fact that cross-border
timber smuggling is made possible transnationally based on both traditional network of
kinship and relationship with State actors implies that the Bru-Van Kieu employ both
moral economy and market economy principles to sustain their livelihood. While the
transaction with co-ethnics on Laos territory is based on traditional sense of mutual help
and  ethnic  cultural  capital,  the  transaction  with  Border  Patrol  on  Vietnam  side  is
calculated on perception of market risk and shared benefits with State and non-State
actors. Different from moral economy in which actors show great effort to minimise risks,
the  Bru-Van  Kieu  in  Katup  Village  are  well  aware  of  the  benefit  and  also  the  risk
accompanying their smuggling activities when dealing with actors outside of their ethnic
moral network. A Bru-Van Kieu engaging in timber smuggling stated that he would not
abuse the relationship with their cross-border co-ethnics as he only maintains a certain
number of cross-border smuggling trips enough to keep his household economy above
average despite constant demand from Kinh intermediate for more supply. His reasoning
is to not upset fellow villagers or cross-border co-ethnics by becoming too engaging in
becoming rich. The act of smuggling represents the mentality of a rational Bru-Van Kieu
peasant  who  tried  to  strike  a  delicate  balance  between  moral  and  market  economy
principles.
41 This analysis shows that the Bru-Van Kieu are not passive agents of the development
process  as  they  can  utilise  both  traditional  and  official  resources  to  support  their
livelihood. The study resonates with Forsyth (2009, p. 271) in reminding us to be careful
not  to  fall  into  the  pitfall  of  “resistance  mentality”  which  “assuming  State-society
relations are always about  resistance,  or  that  certain groups are unwilling to accept
changes, or that change must necessarily instill resistance”. 
 
State-making by accommodating informal activities
42 Before the intensification of cross-border official trading, the State exercises a relaxed
degree of border control. To the locals the border was an abstract concept at the time
because they were free to roam the area and there was not significant presence of State
representatives at local levels to remind them that they are in fact crossing from one
State to another. Since the increase of cross-border trade, the State has emphasised on
controlling  the  flowing  of  material  and  people  for  taxation,  as  well  as  preventing
smuggling. The increased presence of law enforcement, along with popular education on
the topic of  border and sovereignty change the perception of  local  people of  border
realities.  Despite  official  education efforts,  local  peoples  interpretation of  the  State’s
concept of territory is influenced mainly by economic and social interest. The difference
in  level  of  official  investment  in  infrastructure  development  projects  providing
electricity, clean water, housing, education and health care creates a sharp contrast in
socio-economic settings on the two sides of the border and provide locals people with a
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hardened line  of  separation.  Local  people  may accommodate  the  State’s  concepts  of
territory without necessarily abandoning indigenous concept. Cross-border farming and
ethnic/cultural interactions point to the prevalence of traditional space which is barely
affected  by  official  territorial  boundaries. The  Bru-Van  Kieu  make  use  of  official
definition of territory to their advantage to exploit other ethnic groups economically (e.g
making money from Kinh people passing the border on boat) or newly created economic
opportunities (e.g the smuggling of timber, collection of forest products across border to
supply domestic demand brought about by the exclusion from resources access). At the
same  time,  they  challenge  this  very  concept  through  activities  deemed  illegal  and
subversive from the official perspective. The State does not have enough financial and
human resources to exercise maximum enforcement of political borders. As a result, it
cannot create an absolute authority on border people. Within its limited resources, the
State places its priority on controlling territory and natural  resources more than on
controlling local population and their cultural geography.
43 With increasing transnational trade, the need to control local populations becomes more
urgent,  thus  the  State increases  its  presence  in  the  border  area.  However,  de  jure
territorial  control  does  not  automatically  translate  into  de  facto power  over  the
population on this territory because before the imposition of official rules, human space/
geography in this area was governed by traditional and indigenous laws. What is, then,
the actual process of official enforcement and regulation in the border area? In order to
set control on local border population, the State relies on practical rules resulting from
negotiation  and  compromises  with  local  activities.  These  rules,  established  via
negotiation with local actors grant the State space to exercise its authority, admittedly
partial, regarding the cross-border flow of people and material. The fact that States come
to being through the practical exercise of these rules supports the argument that the
State is not a monolithic entity. In fact it is an effect of the practices and interactions
between different State and non-State actors. 
44 Border making is not a passive notion or simple line drawn on the map but an active
process involving different State and non-State actors that may provide a closer look into
State-society relations. The authors argue that it is State-territorialisation, by creating a
zone of exclusion or inclusion that has created a constructed space where State and non-
State actors constantly contest. Although the practices of State representatives at local
level conflict with what they are mandated to,  they are in fact part of State-making.
Through negotiations between local officials and ethnic minority people which results in
compromises and tolerance of illicit activities, the State starts to set practical rules and
gradually gain a foothold in an area which until recently was still out of reach from the
State authority. This analysis implies that the process of State-making is based on local
specifics.  That  is  to  say  the  State might  have  to  compromise  their  indivisible and
monolithic nature to accommodate “illicit” activities and informal rules to be able to gain
the first stepping stones to gain authority. From the local people’s perspective, accepting
State authority at village level can be seen as a gain because the relationship forged with
local State actors enable the Bru-Van Kieu to operate in a quasi-official mode with people
of different ethnicity beyond their social familiarity for economic gain. 
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Conclusion
45 This paper describes the dynamics between State-territorialisation in the border area,
understood  as  a  strategy  of  State-making  and  enhancing  the  State’s  authority,  and
responses  of  local  people.  Exercising  internal  territorialisation  by  establishing
administration  over  people  and  resources,  the  State has  marginalised  local  ethnic
minority group leading the latter to seek intensification of cross-border use of natural
and  cultural  resources.  This,  in  turn,  compromises  the  sovereign  aspect  of  State-
territorialisation. Sovereign-territorialisation, aiming at creating a State boundary within
which a universal set of official rules can be applied, is threatened by the re-invention of
traditional ethnic institution. Not abandoning its objective of establishing rules for all
subjects within its sovereign, the State gives concession to border citizens for the use of
informal rules regarding cross-border flow of human and resources. It should, however,
be  reminded  that  this  relationship  between  State rules  and  informal  rules  is  under
constant re-negotiation. The analysis that while the State can be accommodating, local
ethnic minority people are also not passive but are able to use their tradition agencies to
negotiate  with  more  powerful  actor  helps  dismantle  not  only  the  image  of  a  rigid,
uncompromising and monolithic State but also the view that ethnic minority people are
passive beneficiaries of macro State and economic processes. While the political behavior
of  Bru-Van  Kieu  people  is  in  resonance  with  Scott’s  school  of  moral  economy  and
everyday resistance, it would be for the benefit of ethnic groups in general if researchers
and development planners are careful not to portray them in overly romanticised or “
traditional” settings that deny their ability to take advantages of new official and market
opportunities. 
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NOTES
1. Phủ  biên tạp lục is compilation of miscellaneous records when the southern borderland was
conquered. The record included noted various governing activities of Nguyen lords in frontier
area. It was originally written in a traditional script based on Chinese style by Lê Quý Đôn in 1776
and translated into modern Vietnamese alphabet by various authors. In this paper, the version
translated by Đào Duy Anh in 2007 was used.
2. The Nguyen includes nine lords who governed Cochinchina from 1558 to 1776 and 13 kings
who were directly descendants of these Lords officially rule the country from 1802 to 1945. 
3. Thuan Hoa is  a  historical  term indicating  a  geographic area  including modern Quang Tri
Province and Thua Thien Hue Province
4. Precursor of modern Socialist Republic of Vietnam
5. Annamite Cordillera or “Trường Sơn” in Vietnamese is the mountainous range separating Laos
and Vietnam extending to nearly 1,100km. 
6. Meaning “Small Katup”.
7. The Katup-Ma Hat Village Group, consisting of four villages stretching nearly seven km along
the Sepon River, has its administrative centre in Katup Noy Village, on the Laos side of the Sepon
River,  just  opposite  Katup  Village.  Unlike  Vietnam  where  administrative  system  is  well-
structured in a hierarchy from central level to provincial level, then to district level and lastly, to
commune level,  the same system in Laos is  designed only to district level.  In the absence of
government system at local level, Katup-Ma Hat Village Group is governed by customary rules.
There is a presence of Laotian Border Patrol in the area, however, their task is not to administer
local population but mainly to protect territorial integrity. For the remainder of this article, the
term Katup Village only refers to the Bru-Van Kieu village on Vietnam side of the border, unless
otherwise stated. 
8. Bollywood is common name of Litsea glutinosa, a rainforest tree species.
9. Popular name for Land Use Right Certificate. This official certificate, awarded to household,
does not recognise a well-demarcated land plot as household's property but only the right to use
the land for certain duration.
10. Delay in official issuance of Red Book for Katup villagers is only a matter of technical issue. 
11. Industrial cassava local-type KM49 is suitable for nutrient-poor soil.
12. Wild bananas are a popular product among Kinh buyers. A bitter banana, full of hard seeds, is
submerged in rice-wine to enhance its flavour for domestic use. Banana flowers appeal to Kinh
housewives, because they can be used in making a variety of dishes.
13. Girls as young as 12 to 13 years old also engage in collecting NTFPs. However, the gender
dimensions and child labour involved in these tasks are not discussed in this paper. 
14. A group of three to four male kinsmen venture into Bru-Van Kieu territory, and even Bru-
Makong territory in Laos, to purchase processed timber. The timber is already harvested, dried,
and sawn to fit the capacity of a normal motorbike. While the job of collecting timber among the
Laotian  Bru  is  less  risky  because  the  sparse  Laotian  law  enforcement  cannot  control  daily
activities in the forest, the occasional transport of timber into Vietnam is more risky because of
the presence of forest rangers and police at multiple checkpoints along the road. Therefore, the
men usually use a cheap and expendable motorbike for the task. If they encounter Laotian law
enforcement, they would abandon both their motorbike and timber and run away. Although the
job  is  high-risk  and  becoming  more  difficult,  it  brings  more  profit  than  other  livelihood
activities. After transporting timber from Laos, they sell it to intermediaries in Lao Bao Town,
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who in turn will transport it to lowland urban markets. If successful, each member of the group
may see a profit of two-to-three million VND (USD 100–150) from each timber-smuggling trip to
Laos. 
15. Tan Kim 2 was one of seven newly established village-based production units in Lao Bao in
1975including Duy Tan, Cao Viet, An Ha, Tan Kim 1, Tan Kim 2, Xuan Phuoc, and Vinh Hoa.
16. The population decreased in 1979 when a group of Kinh households could not adapt to the
natural and social conditions of Lao Bao Town and returned to their original commune. The date
is  collected from several  Huong Hoa District  Statistical  Year-books for 1991–1995,  1995–1998,
1997–2001, 2005, and 2011.
17. This  male  elder  fought  in  a  local  guerrilla-army that was  heavily  connected to  the pro-
socialist  provisional  district  government during the war;  hence,  he had vast experience with
official  business.  Lao  Bao  Town  People's  Committee  must  have  seen  this  elder  as  an  ideal
messenger between the State authority and the villagers.
18. The household registration book, personal identity card (for individuals 16 years and older),
health insurance card, land-use-rights certificate, birth certificate, and the marriage certificate. 
19. There are four polygamous households in Katup Village.
20. Because the system does not recognise the second wife, all newborns of the second spouse are
officially registered as children of the first wife. 
21. There are five housewives who initially were of  Laotian having converted to Vietnamese
citizenship by marriage in Katup Village.
22. Among 72 households in Katup Village, 69 engaged in daily collection of non-timber forest
product  such as  bamboo sprout,  fuel  wood,  bird,  bee  honey and porcupine's  stomach,  25  in
swidden farming; and 38 in timber extraction such as teak in Laos territory
23. The fee was about VND 10,000 (equivalent to USD 0.5) as of mid-2013
24. Official barriers from their village where they usually store their smuggled timber before
dispatching  to  their  next  destination of  Kinh  intermediate  living  along  the  main  National
Highway or Kinh carpenters in Lao Bao Town includes not only Border Patrol but also Public
Security, Market Control, Tax and Traffic Control. Nonetheless, the bribe to Border Patrol is one-
off as they do not have to trickle their profit to other law enforcements. Without further detail,
the Bru-Van Kieu suspect that their bribe would be divided among these forces.
25. Includes but not limit to dissemination of different national policies, organizing of soldier-
villagers meetings in national celebration days to instill a sense of national identity.
ABSTRACTS
The human geography of Vietnam’s upland area has been transformed significantly during the
last 40 years due to the increasing control from the central government. We argue that State
territorialisation, understood as a strategy of State-making and assertion of the State’s authority,
has  the  tendency  to  marginalise,  socially  and  politically,  local  ethnic  minority  peoples  by
excluding  them  from  indigenous  social  and  economic  geography  and  the  use  of  natural
resources. At the receiving end of these official policies, the local ethnic minority people do not
passively accept their marginalisation but are able to initiate the use of traditional cross-border
cultural  resources  to  improve  their  condition.  By  analysing  the  tolerance  from local  official
towards illicit cross-border activities daily carried out by local people, the case study provides
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some  insights  on  the  dynamics  of  power  struggle  between  the  State and  local  people.  We
concluded that local ethnic minority peoples actively re-negotiate with more powerful State and
economic actors and re-shape local border politics while the State is not always uncompromising
and monolithic as it is usually portrayed. 
La géographie humaine de la zone montagneuse du Vietnam s'est considérablement modifiée au
cours des 40 dernières  années en raison du renforcement du contrôle  exercé par le  pouvoir
central.  Nous  argumentons  que  la  territorialisation  en  tant  que  stratégie  de  formation  et
d'affirmation de l'autorité de l'État tend à marginaliser les minorités ethniques locales en les
excluant de la géographie socio-politique indigène et de l'utilisation des ressources naturelles.
Ces minorités n'acceptent pas passivement cette marginalisation et ont recours à l'utilisation des
ressources culturelles traditionnelles transfrontalières pour améliorer leur condition. Analysant
la  tolérance  des  autorités  locales  envers  les  activités  transfrontalières  illicites  menées
quotidiennement par les populations locales, notre étude de cas apporte quelques éclairages sur
les dynamiques de la lutte de pouvoir qui les oppose à l'État. Nous en concluons que ces minorités
ethniques renégocient activement avec des acteurs étatiques et économiques plus puissants et
recomposent les politiques frontalières locales tandis que l'État ne se montre pas toujours aussi
intransigeant et monolithique qu'on le dépeint généralement. 
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